The personite problem
Webb3 nov. 2024 · This response focuses on Peacocke’s subtle treatment of the identity of subjects and his intriguing account of how it might resolve the personite or fellow-traveller worries set out in my “Personites, Maximality and Ontological Trash” (Nous, 2024), “The Personite Problem” (Philosophical Perspectives, 2016) and, with Sarah-Jane Leslie, … Webb12 nov. 2024 · For all personites x, there are a possible object y and possible world w such that y is a person in w and y in w is a duplicate of x in the actual world. Therefore, all …
The personite problem
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WebbMark Johnston has recently argued that four-dimensionalist theories of persistence are incompatible with some of our most basic ethical and prudential principles. I argue that … WebbBut as I discuss in this talk, relating to contemporary discussions in metaontology, this response for principled reasons doesn’t work. The problems I discuss illustrate the significance of metaontological considerations for issues in ethics and metaethics, and generalize widely beyond the personite problem.
WebbStage theory and the personite problem Alex Kaiserman Analysis 79 (2):215-222 ( 2024 ) Copy BIBTEX Abstract Mark Johnston has recently argued that four-dimensionalist theories of persistence are incompatible with some of our … Webb2 The personite problem Johnston and Olson are both concerned with the problem posed for ethical thinking by what Johnston calls personites (and Olson calls subpeople): ‘‘shorter-lived very person-like things that extend …
Webb1 juli 2024 · Mark Johnston and Eric Olson have both pressed what Johnston has dubbed the personite problem. Personites, if they exist, are person-like entities whose lives … Webbpersonites. A person could have been exactly like that personite. Perhaps your life could have been cut short, something just like the personite you consider could have sprung …
Webbwronging! _.17 The personite problem is disastrous … for our ordinary moral outlook. 18 In the following sections, I argue that a worm theorist can and should deny Johnston [s claim that personites like Andrew-minus will not receive any compensating benefits.19 My case 16 Johnston (2024: 623 –624) 17 ibid. 18 Johnston (2016: 206)
WebbMark Johnston and Eric Olson have both pressed what Johnston has dubbed the personite problem. Personites, if they exist, are person-like entities whose lives extend over a … inclined railwaysWebbdetails. Mark Johnston and Eric Olson have both pressed what Johnston has dubbed the personite problem. Personites, if they exist, are person-like entities whose lives extend over a continuous proper part of a person’s life. They are so person-like that they seem to have moral status if persons do. inc authority realWebbEmergence: The Personite Problem, Tielo Falk, James Sterling. Des milliers de livres avec la livraison chez vous en 1 jour ou en magasin avec -5% de réduction . inclined rackWebb1 sep. 2024 · According to the worm theory, persons are (maximal) aggregates of person-stages existing at different times. Personites, on the other hand, are non-maximal … inclined railroadWebb11 juli 2024 · Though a personite thinks or utters the word ‘I’, the referent isn’t that very personite; instead, ‘I’ refers to the person. Thus both the person and the personites know that “I am a person” and that “I have the persistence conditions of a person”—since the referent of ‘I’ (the person) is indeed a person and has the corresponding persistence … inclined rampWebbPersonites are shorter-lived, person-like things that extend across part of a person’s life. Their existence follows from the standard perdurance view of persons. Johnston argues … inclined renoWebbShareable Link. Use the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more. inclined rectangular weir-flow modeling